Incentivizing Credit Rating Agencies under the Issuer Pay Model Through a Mandatory Compensation Competition by Rhee, Robert J.
Law & Business
V O L U M E  3 3   N U M B E R  4  A P R I L  2 0 1 4
Credit rating agencies assign credit ratings to bond issues and issuers. Most public bonds carry 
a credit rating. Credit ratings impact the price at 
which bonds are issued in their primary market and 
traded in secondary markets, and the assessment of 
risk in the portfolios of investors. These factors are 
directly linked to the regulation of bond investors 
such as banks, broker-dealers, insurers, investment 
funds, and other financial institutions.
Although rating agencies are some of the most 
important institutions of the global capital markets, 
they have long been criticized for poor performance. 
Most recently, they failed to rate accurately structured 
finance instruments during the years leading up to the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009. The systematic overrat-
ing of complex structured finance securities inflated 
valuations and investor demand, reduced the percep-
tion of risk, and permitted wholesale investments in 
de facto junk bonds by regulated financial institu-
tions. The financial crisis would not have occurred 
had rating agencies performed properly.2 Rating 
agencies are important monitors of the global finan-
cial industry.
Reform of the industry is one of the most impor-
tant unresolved agendas of post-financial crisis market 
regulation. Congress, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the securities industry, and schol-
ars are actively scrutinizing the problem. Proposals 
include promoting more competition among rating 
agencies, imposing greater civil liability, changing rat-
ing agency compensation structures from issuer-pay to 
user-pay models, and substituting credit ratings with 
market metrics. For reasons explained in earlier articles, 
these reform proposals are problematic and are most 
likely infeasible.3
The key problem in the industry is compensation 
and incentives, which is recognized in the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd–Frank Act). The statute requires studies of 
“alternative means for compensating nationally recog-
nized statistical rating organizations that would create 
incentives for accurate credit ratings.”4 In singling out 
compensation for study, Congress correctly recognized 
the link among compensation, incentive, and quality 
of credit ratings. But there has been no feasible reform 
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proposal. Fixing the problem requires positively linking 
compensation and incentive.
A solution does not require a fundamental recon-
figuration of the industry or regulation. The status quo 
of the much-maligned industrial organization can be 
maintained as a baseline reality. Rating agencies can still 
play vital roles in the regulation of financial institutions 
and investment portfolios. A solution can still continue 
the existence of a highly concentrated market and 
accept the much-criticized issuer-pay model. From the 
perspective of regulatory feasibility, the simplest path 
forward requires the least amount of structural change 
to large, complex institutions and capital markets. This 
contrarian approach counterintuitively leads to the 
most effective reform.
The basic problem is this: industry concentration 
coupled with the issuer-pay model reduces the incen-
tive to compete and perform. Because incentive is 
the condition necessary to induce competition, the 
problem can be fixed by implementing a structured 
compensation scheme overlaid onto the issuer-pay 
model. The simplest solution is to establish a manda-
tory pay-for-performance compensation scheme in 
which a fixed percentage of accrued revenue is ceded 
to fund a performance bonus. At periodic intervals, the 
regulator should award the bonus to the best perform-
ing rating agency for the period on a winner-take-all 
basis. Proper incentive is achieved through mandatory 
participation in a compensation competition. This idea 
of pay-for-performance requires minimal regulatory 
intrusion into the industry. The proposal benefits from 
simplicity, administrability, and economic feasibility. It 
can fundamentally reform the industry with minimal 
disruption, even though the rating agencies themselves 
may not warm to the idea of competing harder and 
risking accrued revenue.
Poor Performance and Its Causes
Systemic poor performance of rating agencies poses 
deep problems of public policy and economics. Rating 
agencies played key roles in creating the bubbly condi-
tion leading to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. There 
is a consensus narrative. Rating agencies systematically 
overrated highly speculative structured finance securi-
ties, backed by residential mortgages. The results were 
catastrophic. By 2010, more than 90 percent of the 
subprime mortgage-backed securities issued between 
2006 and 2007 with triple-A ratings had been down-
graded to junk bonds by Moody’s and S&P.5 In 2006, 
Moody’s assigned triple-A ratings on 30 mortgage-
related securities per day, and 83 percent of these secu-
rities were ultimately downgraded.6 Rating agencies 
engaged in egregiously lax and irresponsible business 
practices, and systematically failed to do proper due 
diligence. If rating agencies had rated these securi-
ties as junk bonds, the financial crisis would not have 
occurred. Investor demand would have collapsed due 
to regulatory restrictions on investments, and the secu-
ritization pipeline fueling the housing bubble would 
have been broken.
The problems of the credit rating industry have 
many causes. Commentators have identified the fol-
lowing major factors, which have been generally 
accepted as a model of the problem.
• Conflict of Interest. Rating agencies are said to have an 
inherent conflict of interest arising from the issuer-
pay fee structure.7 The issuer pays the fee for the 
credit rating service, rather than the bond investor or 
a subscriber to rating information. Issuers and invest-
ment bankers can “shop” for ratings, and this com-
petition for business can compromise the objectivity 
of rating agencies.8
• Lack of Competition. Rating agencies do not com-
pete so much as coexist in a profitable market.9 The 
market is heavily concentrated with Moody’s and 
S&P dominating the market as a duopoly plus Fitch 
as a major player. This “duopoly plus” state reduces 
competiveness. Competition is further muted by the 
industry custom of obtaining multiple ratings from 
two or more rating agencies. Most new bond issues 
carry multiple ratings.10
• Ineffectiveness of Reputation Capital. Reputation capi-
tal may ensure a certain level of quality, but it does 
not incentivize performance well when there is 
not a competitive market. Only the three duopoly 
plus firms are large enough to meet the aggregate 
demand of the bond market. The profitability of 
the major rating agencies is primarily a function 
of market environment and investors’ appetite for 
fixed-income securities, which dictate the demand 
for rating services.
• Regulatory Barriers. Regulatory barriers protect rat-
ing agencies from competitors. Fearing fly-by-
night rating agencies, the SEC has parsimoniously 
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granted regulatory status. At the same time, financial 
regulators require institutional investors and broker-
dealers to obtain credit ratings for debt securi-
ties in their investment portfolios. This regulatory 
requirement is difficult to substitute, making credit 
ratings necessary to the architecture of investment 
regulation. These regulatory barriers have frozen out 
new competitors, stifled competition among rating 
agencies, and diminished the importance of reputa-
tion capital.
• Natural Barriers. Large rating agencies provide broad 
coverage of an enormous credit market, and system-
atize credit information. This information platform 
is important to investors and regulators. There is a 
positive network effect to size and scale, that is, the 
benefit of having the broad spectrum of bonds and 
issuers in the very large credit market be rated under 
presumably a common methodology. Newer and 
smaller rating agencies lack this broad capability.
• Complexity of Modern Finance. For much of their 
history, rating agencies analyzed plain vanilla cor-
porate bonds. Structured finance securities such as 
mortgaged-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations are much more complicated in structure 
and valuation. Credit analysis has become more dif-
ficult as financial markets, and securities instruments 
have become more complex.
• Implicit Collusion with Investors. A “sinister danger”11 is 
that investors also implicitly wanted overrated secu-
rities during the credit rating bubble. Inflated credit 
ratings permitted regulated investors and portfolios 
to invest in risky securities that were expected to 
produce greater yields. They gave greater discretion 
to pursue profitable yields than regulation would 
have otherwise allowed.
This litany of causal factors shows that the industrial 
organization of the credit rating industry is uniquely 
problematic. Rating agencies are not optimally orga-
nized to provide the highest quality credit ratings, 
and the problem has been difficult to solve. A major 
problem has been the inadequate link between com-
pensation and proper incentive. The effectiveness 
of a reputation market as a bond on performance is 
questionable at best. The lack of robust competition 
and proper bonding of performance will continue to 
undermine the quality of credit ratings even as rat-
ing agencies continue to play an important role in an 
increasingly complex capital market.
Compensation Competition as 
the Solution
In regulating the credit rating industry, the goal of 
regulation should be to create the necessary conditions 
to stimulate robust competition where currently the 
market does not work well due to cozy coopera-
tive relationships among nominal competitors. Proper 
incentive is the condition precedent to robust, positive 
competition. The basic problem is not the lack of strong 
competition per se. Competition can be good or bad. 
A competitive race to the bottom in a frenzy for busi-
ness engagements would be a bad thing. Strong com-
petition is good only if it incentivizes a race to excel. 
Competition is not the end, but the means.
Any reform measure must solve the incentive 
 problem. There is not a strong incentive to improve the 
quality of credit ratings when the market is  concentrated 
among a few competitors whose business interests are 
well protected by regulatory licenses,  natural barriers of 
entry, and the benefits of market share—a nicely profit-
able arrangement for rating agencies.
The inevitable outcome of a concentrated industry 
need not be poor quality ratings. The problem is that 
all three major firms consistently and concurrently 
win because the engagement of one is not done to the 
exclusion of the others and usually involves an engage-
ment of the others as well. From a game theory per-
spective, the firms stand more in a cooperative posture 
with each other than in a competitive one because they 
are essentially partner monopolists. Regulatory reform 
must change the game from a win-win to a win-lose 
outcome to impart the proper incentive.
Mandating a pay-for-performance compensation 
scheme would foster vigorous competition among 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. I assume that firms do not 
like to lose when forced to compete for profit. This 
assumption is empirically sound. A pay-for-performance 
scheme does not naturally arise due to the unique 
aspects of the industry. Easy profits and regulatory rents 
undermine competitiveness and suppress the incentive 
to excel. Reform must create the condition for compe-
tition through pay-for-performance incentives.
The Proposal
My proposal assumes that the industrial structure 
and practices remain the same. It does not depend on 
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eliminating the issuer-pay model. The amount of fees, 
payment forms, and other transactional considerations 
remain private matters. But rating agencies should be 
made to bond their performance. To accomplish this, 
we do not need a heavy-handed regulatory intrusion, 
only a marginal adjustment to the issuer-pay model. 
The pay-for-performance scheme entails the creation 
of a mandatory performance bonus. It is a hybrid 
public–private compensation scheme. For the portion 
of the revenue not ceded, the compensation scheme 
would be determined by private actors, but the ceded 
revenue would constitute a publicly administered com-
pensation plan.
To start, we limit participation to Moody’s, S&P, 
and Fitch. The three rating agencies would submit a 
small portion of their revenue to fund a bonus pool of 
deferred compensation, an incentive bonus. For illus-
trative purposes, let’s assume a bonus pool based on 5 
percent of accrued revenue. At regular intervals, the 
performance of each agency would be statistically evalu-
ated by an independent agency based upon regulatory 
disclosure requirements that for the most part are already 
in place.12 Regulatory oversight would be limited to 
independent confirmation of performance. Upon evalu-
ation, the best performer is identified and the incentive 
bonus would be awarded on a winner-take-all basis.
The contribution must be based on a fixed percent-
age of revenue, and not on a common flat contribu-
tion. A fixed contribution does not work because the 
amount has relative value to each firm, and thus incen-
tives and financial effects are not symmetric. The con-
tribution must be a fixed percentage of revenue, which 
would result in different contribution amounts by each 
firm. This rule creates a technical problem: how do we 
equitably and symmetrically allocate the bonus in light 
of the different contributions made?
The scheme should permit different levels of con-
tribution in a three-way game, but always maintain a 
1-to-1 payout ratio. There is a simple solution to the 
problem. The condition is met only when there are two 
concurrently played sub-games within the larger com-
petition. The “main game” would involve a three-way 
competition with the bonus amount calculated as three 
times the contribution of the smallest player. The “side 
game” would involve a two-way competition with the 
bonus amount calculated as the contribution in excess 
of the main-game allocation. Since the side game would 
be between the two larger players only, the ceded 
revenue is capped at the revenue contribution of the 
second largest player. In a multiplayer game, these rules 
maintain a 1-to-1 payout ratio as to all players, thus 
maintaining fairness and symmetry of economic stakes.
An example illustrates how the proposed rules work. 
Assume that 5 percent of revenue for S, M, and F are 
120, 100, and 50. Because S is the largest player, it can 
only contribute 100, which is the contribution of the 
second largest player, M. The smallest player, F, con-
tributes 50. The total bonus pool is 250. The allocation 
is based on the following rules: the winner in the main 
game among S, M, and F gets 150; the winner in the 
side game between S and M gets 100. If S or M wins 
outright against all competitors, it would win the main 
and side games and thus collect 250. If F wins the main 
game, it would get 150, but since F did not contribute 
to the side game it is precluded from this game. There 
would still be a side game between S and M, who have 
staked additional funds, for the 100.
We can apply these simple allocation rules to a 
compensation competition among Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch. Suppose firms S, M, and F earn these revenues: 
S(s), M(m), and F( f) where s > m > f. Since S earns 
the most revenue of the three players, it needs to con-
tribute only m, the contribution of the second largest 
player. In each competition period, the payoffs and 
losses can be generalized as follows:
There would always be a three-way “main game” 
in which M, S, and F compete for these stakes: (1) if F 
wins, three times its contribution; or (2) if M or S wins, 
the entire bonus pool. If F wins the main game, there 
would always be a “side game” between M and S for the 
Table 1: Model of Payouts
Players
S or M F
2m + f 3f
–m –f
2m – 2f not applicable
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(when S or M wins)
Net Win/Loss
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contributions they made into the bonus pool in excess 
of F’s bonus.
The side game can yield a net win or a net loss, 
depending on the size of F’s contribution relative to those 
of M and S. Losing the main game but winning the side 
game may result in a net gain if F’s contribution is much 
smaller. However, if the three competitors are similar 
sizes, winning the side game may result in a net loss.
For example, assume that the ceded revenues are 
S = 100, M = 100, F = 40 (thus, the total bonus pool 
is 240), and that F wins the main game and S wins the 
side game. The results would be:
Since the side-game allocation between S and M is 
large enough to offset the loss of ceded revenue, S is a 
net winner even though it lost the main game.
Now, assume that the ceded revenues are S = 100, 
M = 100, F = 80 (thus, the total bonus pool is 280), 
and again F wins the main game and S wins the side 
game. The results would be:
Here, even after winning the side game, S is a net 
loser because F has won most of the bonus pool by 
winning the main game. Thus, the side game is mean-
ingful to the two losers of the main game, and the 
winner can either net a gain or mitigate a loss, depend-
ing on the smaller competitor’s contribution of ceded 
revenue.
Under the above rules, all three rating agencies will 
always have “skin in the game.” The game is perfect 
from the perspective of symmetric incentives and equi-
ties among players of disparate wealth contributions. 
Importantly, the competition is zero sum and the 
“awards” are self-funded.
Financial Effects
The creation of a bonus pool raises an important 
question: What is the financial effect of the proposal? 
The financial analysis goes to the issue of economic and 
business feasibility, which in turn is relevant to legal 
feasibility as well. In the above discussion, I use an illus-
trative bonus amount of 5 percent. The financial effects 
of this compensation competition will not materially 
affect the companies’ operations.
If either Moody’s or S&P were to continually lose 
the competition to the other such that it would incur 
a perpetual loss of 5 percent of ceded revenue, there 
would be a loss of equity value reflecting lost profit-
ability. In a robust competition, however, no firm will 
always win or lose. The actual range of potential valu-
ation effects will be marginal.
It is unlikely that we would see a substantial net loss 
in value for two reasons. First, the 5 percent is always 
ceded, which means that the mandatory contribution 
reduces revenue but does not add variance to a firm’s 
financial results. The ceded revenue is a fixed obliga-
tion like overhead expense. Second, exposure to risk 
from the competition can be reduced to zero through 
perfect hedging. A shareholder needs to buy one share 
each in the three firms of the duopoly plus to fully 
invest in the credit rating sector. This investment strat-
egy perfectly diversifies the unique risk of each firm 
with respect to the bonus. In other words, a diversified 
investor would assume no greater volatility of earnings 
or cash flow due to the zero-sum nature of the com-
pensation game. Thus, there is no significant loss of 
value from the proposal.
The next question is whether the 5 percent figure 
is feasible as a business proposition. The answer is 
clearly “yes.” A review of the financial performances of 
Moody’s and S&P shows that there is substantial room 
to impose a mandatory contribution. Table 4 shows 
the 2012 revenue, operating profit, and operating 
margin of Moody’s, S&P, Goldman Sachs, Accenture, 
Table 2: Example of Positive Payout from 
Side Game
Awards
Ceded revenue
Net gain / loss
S M F
 120 0 120
–100 –100 –40
   +20 –100 +80
Table 3: Example of Negative Payout from 
Side Game
Awards
Ceded revenue
Net gain / loss
S M F
40 0 240
–100 –100 –80
    –60 –100 +160
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Lazard, and FTI Consulting. These firms operate in 
different industry sectors, but they provide significant 
professional advisory services. Goldman Sachs is a lead-
ing investment bank, and Accenture, Lazard, and FTI 
are leading advisory businesses. Table 4 provides finan-
cial data on these companies as compared to Moody’s 
and S&P.
Moody’s and S&P have high operating profit margins 
compared to other leading firms shown in Table 4. Keep 
in mind that the above firms are different businesses, but 
the different levels of financial performance are stark. A 
ceding rate of 5 percent would have significant impact 
on any business (of course), but the important takeaway 
is that, on the whole, the rating agencies would not be 
financially threatened in any way. If the operating prof-
its of advisory services are the benchmark (7 percent to 
13 percent), the rating agencies could cede as much as 
25 percent of revenue and still be within the range of 
financial feasibility. The proposed competition would 
have a small impact on margins and financial operations, 
but as the analysis also shows, the rating agencies would 
have substantial economic incentive to win the game 
because 5 percent ceded revenue is still a lot of money 
at stake.
Implementation Issues and Objections
Coordination and Collusion
In light of the duopoly plus industry structure, one 
concern may be whether rating agencies would implic-
itly coordinate or collude. The three rating agencies may 
be tempted to take a “one for you, one for me” collusive 
approach to the bonus payment. Forced competition 
requires greater effort and quite probably greater invest-
ments that reduce profit. In a zero-sum game, the desire 
to maintain the status quo and signal détente would be 
great. This is not a serious concern.
At the firm level, tacit coordination may appear pos-
sible due to the limited number of competitors, but as a 
practical matter such a feat would be difficult to execute. 
The situation here is not akin to price fixing in which 
only a few decisions by a few actors would be needed 
to coordinate with other firms. In a rating agency, such 
centralized decisionmaking does not exist. Each rating 
agency has more than a thousand credit analysts and 
supervisors, and each rating requires a credit commit-
tee of various compositions of analysts, all of whom 
would presumably be exercising independent judgments 
on many thousands of bond issues and monitoring of 
outstanding issues. Coordinating collusion cannot occur 
absent an explicitly illegal, broadly disseminated (thus 
easily discoverable) edict from the executive suite or the 
boardroom.
Even if there is an illicit conspiracy to undermine the 
competition from the top, such top-down coordination 
cannot work when there are thousands of decision points 
in each firm that must then be coordinated with those of 
several other firms. Coordinating performance and statis-
tical outcomes, many of which are subject to uncertainty 
and market forces, would be practically infeasible. A 
misstep in any coordinated action would quickly unravel 
a coalition. A collusive agreement among three players 
would be highly unstable, and would likely devolve into 
active competition once the pattern of “one for you, one 
for me” is broken due to cheating, miscalculation, or 
some exogenous factor leading to unintended or unex-
pected outcomes.
Standard for Performance Assessments
A pay-for-performance scheme requires performance 
standards. There are questions as to the metric to be 
measured, the method for measurement, and the timing 
of measurement and compensation. How does an agency 
determine “the winner”? I do not offer or advocate a 
specific assessment protocol. The purpose of this article 
is to present the conceptual framework for reform. 
However, I suggest that the problem of performance 
measurement is neither insurmountable nor paramount.
The assessment criteria must be based on accuracy 
and not on downward deviations of issues from ratings. 
The focus should not be on how many issues were over-
rated since it would impose a bias toward underrated 
securities. The magnitude of the error should count 
but not directionality. Timeliness is also an important 
Table 4: Comparison of Financial Data
FY2012 
($ million) Revenue
Operating 
Profit Margin
Moody’s
S&P
1,958
2,034
947
849
48.4%
41.7%
Goldman Sachs 34,163 11,207 32.80%
Accenture
Lazard
FTI Consulting
29,778
1,912
1,577
3,872
124
169
13.0%
6.5%
10.7%
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consideration. It does the investor no good for a rating 
agency to downgrade the debt of a company on the eve 
of bankruptcy. Thus, directional correctness and timeli-
ness are the two most important factors in formulating 
the assessment criteria.
The evaluating criteria must cover performance 
along all asset classes including difficult-to-rate struc-
tured finance instruments. This requirement would not 
open up the possibility of gaming by the rating agen-
cies through calculated changes in the business mix. 
The mathematics of profitability precludes gaming the 
business mix because the ceded revenue is only a small 
portion of the fees earned. In concrete terms, a rating 
agency would be unlikely to give up 95 percent of a 
highly profitable business line to enhance its chances 
of winning the 5 percent bonus pool, particularly since 
complex instruments such as structured finance bonds 
generate significantly higher profit margins.
Competent experts would be required to propose 
a statistical method to measure the quality of perfor-
mance. Such experts are numerous in the academy and 
the financial profession. The SEC could also solicit the 
three largest rating agencies as well as various constitu-
ents of the capital market, including bond investors, to 
provide proposed rules and comments on the question 
of assessment. The standard could be as simple as provid-
ing a universal standard of the probability of default per 
each rating, and an assessment could be made based on 
deviations from the defined standard as weighted by the 
number of issues and time. Much of the data analysis can 
be performed with the use of technology and algorithms.
Although the assessment should be primarily based 
on quantitative measures, the SEC could add qualita-
tive factors toward a weighted scorecard of best perfor-
mance. Such factors can include compliance with rules 
and regulations, independent assessments of governance, 
management of conflict of interest, and quality of inter-
nal controls, all of which were issues addressed in both 
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the 
Dodd–Frank Act and implemented in SEC rules.
Can data analysis reveal “the winner”? Yes, because 
there is an enormous volume of statistical data. Table 5 
shows data on outstanding credit ratings reported 
by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
(NRSROs) to the SEC in 2011:13
Because there are so many outstanding, maturing, and 
defaulting issues at any given time, there is an enormous 
volume of data from which we can cull reasonable infer-
ences on performance. The industry custom of multiple 
ratings makes the statistical analysis easier. There is great 
overlap among the top three agencies. For instance, from 
1976 to 2006, 62,496 new domestic issuances of non-
convertible debt were rated, and of these 98.2 percent 
were multiple rated: 67.3 percent by two rating agen-
cies and 30.8 percent by all three agencies.14 As another 
example, in a representative sample of 2,514 corporate 
bonds outstanding at the end of March 1997, Moody’s 
had ratings on 92.5 percent and S&P 90.7 percent.15 
There would be no problem in gathering a dataset based 
on issues expiring and defaulting within defined periods 
of time from which periodic quality assessments could 
be performed.
The compensation competition is a repeat game, 
occurring at regular intervals. It could be based on only 
the bond or debt issues expiring or defaulting during that 
period. These issues would be examined against the per-
formance of the issue, initial rating assigned, and changes 
in rating. Each rating agency would be evaluated on 
the performance of the entire portfolio of expired and 
defaulting issues against the objective performance stan-
dards set for each credit rating.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the proposal is 
what may be called the perfectionist’s challenge: the argu-
ment that any statistical analysis, however sophisticated, 
would not be capable of determining the “true winner.” 
There would be too many technical difficulties, such as 
problems of data sampling, fluidity of credit ratings over 
Table 5: Data on Outstanding Ratings as of 2011
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Other 
NRSROs Total
Financial 
institutions
54,000 61,581 61,550 32,207 209,338
Insurance 
companies
8200 4540 1657 5391 19,788
Corporate 
issuers
44,500 30,285 13,385 11,116 99,286
Asset backed 
securities
117,900 101,546 64,535 18,480 302,461
Government 
issuers
965,900 841,235 363,897 14,694 2,185,726
Total 1,190,500 1,039,187 505,024 81,888 2,816,599
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time, different portfolios of covered bond issues, and 
numerous other factors that make identifying the best per-
former imperfect at best. If one were inclined to oppose 
the idea of a compensation competition, there would be 
many objections based on imperfections. A fair response 
to this criticism might be, “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien” 
(“the best is the enemy of the good”).16 We should not 
let the lack of perfection get in the way of implementing 
something that is a net good.
Epistemological certainty is not needed to implement 
the policy objective. The standard for assessment should 
be reasonably fitted to the objective so that, like any 
performance bonus, the risk of arbitrariness is mitigated. 
Potential errors do not undermine the policy goal. If 
there is objective application of a rational standard, we 
expect that any “errors” would average out for each 
player. Since the compensation game is a classic repeat-
play game, the mathematical expectation from an imper-
fect standard would be zero. In the long run, the risk of 
error is diversified away.
Errors are simply a part of the real world, including the 
legal process. One accepts that any standard of evaluation 
may be imperfect and thus subject to criticism. Virtually 
the entire panorama of human endeavors and observa-
tions is subject to imperfect evaluations and subjective 
probability assessments. Many types of evaluative pro-
cesses are far less quantitatively driven than the proposal 
here and subject to the discretion of individual judgment: 
just to name a few, the typical performance evaluations 
of employees including those of CEOs, tenure reviews of 
academics, strategic considerations in business planning, 
medical evaluations, and judgments in civil trials. We seek 
reasonable outcomes based on objective application of a 
rational standard of evaluation.
“Who is the winner?” is the penultimate question. 
The ultimate inquiry is “Are the players incentivized?” 
From this perspective, a perfect assessment standard is 
not needed to serve this policy end. If a rational standard 
is applied objectively, the rating agencies subject to a 
performance evaluation will be incentivized to produce 
accurate credit ratings for the purpose of winning the 
competition. That there is some uncertainty in the pro-
cess would produce more incentive to win by a clearer 
margin. Any potential for “errors” may actually benefit 
the desired end. Thus, the policy objective is served 
when the standard of evaluation is sufficiently connected 
to the criterion of accuracy, though perfect accuracy is 
not needed.
Dodd–Frank’s Regulatory Foundation
The proposal requires that a regulator collect the 
ceded revenue, assess performance, and award the bonus. 
Regulation must create an agency body to oversee the 
program, and must mandate rating agencies to collect 
and maintain data on performance. In this respect, the 
regulatory foundation necessary to implement the pro-
posal has already been laid, which makes the implemen-
tation of the proposal easier and more feasible.
The Dodd–Frank Act mandates the regulatory frame-
work necessary to collect, maintain, and report data on 
performance. The rating agencies must provide ratings 
based on a common system of ratings, including the 
designation of alphanumeric ratings and the criteria appli-
cable to each rating. The rating agencies already use simi-
lar rating symbols. Section 938 of the Dodd–Frank Act, 
titled “Universal Ratings Symbols,” requires the SEC to 
implement rules and procedures that
(1)  [A]ssess the probability that an issuer of a security or 
money market instrument will default, fail to make 
timely payments, or otherwise not make payments 
to investors in accordance with the terms of the 
security or money market instrument;
(2)  [C]learly define and disclose the meaning of any 
symbol used by the [NRSRO] to denote a credit 
rating; and
(3)  [A]pply any symbol described in paragraph (2) in 
a manner that is consistent for all types of securi-
ties and money market instruments for which the 
symbol is used.17
There will be a universal standard against which the 
performance of rating agencies can be judged and assessed. 
The statute also imposes a regulatory reporting and dis-
closure structure, which has been partially implemented 
through SEC rules.18 If additional rules are required to 
produce a set of statistical disclosures, this can be done 
through the auspices of the Dodd–Frank Act’s mandate.
With respect to an independent body or board that 
would evaluate performance and award the incentive 
bonus, the Dodd–Frank Act created a structure that 
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could fill this role. Section 932 creates an Office of 
Credit Ratings within the SEC.19 Its charge is “to pro-
mote accuracy in credit ratings issued by nationally rec-
ognized statistical rating organizations; and … to ensure 
that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts 
of interest.”20 The statute mandates that the staff should 
have knowledge and expertise in debt instruments, and 
that the Office of Credit Ratings should conduct annual 
examinations of NRSROs.21 If additional expertise or 
input is needed, the Office of Credit Ratings could be 
composed of regulators, academics, and disinterested 
industry professionals who would be tasked with ana-
lyzing performance and making recommendations as to 
the award of a bonus, and could incorporate additional 
methods such as an industry survey of investors and other 
knowledgeable constituents.
The Dodd–Frank Act has enabled at least some of the 
process-based rules necessary to administer a pay-for-
performance compensation scheme. Although not fixing 
the problem directly, it has enacted the regulatory pre-
cursors to fundamental reform based on greater positive 
competition and correctly aligned incentives to perform.
Political Reality of Regulation
The economic and administrative feasibility of the 
proposal here is well within the realm of practical pos-
sibility. More than the potential for collusion or the 
difficulties of performance metric, the political reality of 
effective regulation is the chief impediment to reform 
of the credit rating industry. In any regulation affecting 
corporate and Wall Street interests, there is always the 
reality of political feasibility. Although no one denies 
that better quality credit ratings are clearly a public good, 
there would be significant political opposition to effec-
tive regulation. The idea of regulatory capture has long 
been recognized.
The three rating agencies would oppose any attempt 
to put any contingencies on accrued revenue, however 
small. They would want to keep their rents. The pro-
posal here means that the leading rating agencies would 
have to work harder and incur more costs and invest-
ments in human capital to improve the quality of their 
products and services. The political voices of Moody’s, 
S&P, and Fitch would be significant.
Other powerful voices would speak against mandated 
competition. Investment banks and corporate issuers, 
which yield greater political clout than the three rating 
agencies, would be opposed as well. Issuers like over-
rated bond issues because they lower their costs of bor-
rowing. The oft-cited conflict of interest arises from the 
implicit threat that issuers and their investment bankers 
might funnel rating business to more lenient rating agen-
cies. Investment banks would have a business interest 
in maintaining the status quo of this leverage. Higher 
rated bonds are easier to manage in the issuance process, 
again making the jobs of investment bankers easier. 
Systemically higher credit ratings can increase the over-
all demand for bonds because they relax the regulatory 
restrictions on bond investments.
Lastly, as mentioned previously, the “dirty secret”22 of 
the problem of credit ratings is that investors also benefit 
from overrated bonds. This is not to suggest that bond 
investors like being fooled into bad investments. There 
is a tradeoff for some bond investors: a freer hand in 
pursuing greater yields on investments at the price of less 
accurate credit ratings.
With all this said, the political picture is not so bleak. 
Even as some bond investors may have conflicting interests, 
many institutional investors actually rely on a credit rating 
system that provides broad coverage of the bond market. 
Many institutional bond investors desire a more accurate 
credit rating system. Long-term players in the bond mar-
ket, such as insurance companies, rely on credit ratings. 
The bond market needs the credit rating system, and it is 
quite plausible that a sufficient subset of the bond investor 
community wants greater accuracy in credit ratings to offset 
some of the countervailing political pressures.
Credit rating agencies exist because they provide a 
quantum of value in intermediating information in the 
capital markets and serve a quasi-regulatory role. If the 
benefits of these functions were outweighed by the costs 
of a continuously compromised credit rating system, the 
future of rating agencies would be bleak. This is a pos-
sibility recognized by the rating agencies themselves. We 
must be aware that there is a powerful political coalition 
that has a significant economic interest in maintaining 
the status quo, inherent flaws and costs notwithstanding.
Conclusion
Credit rating agencies suffer from a lack of com-
petition and will to perform better than other agen-
cies, which diminishes the quality of credit ratings. If 
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competition in fact does not exist, regulation should 
induce it. Large numbers of competitors are not needed 
to achieve robust, positive competition. Contrary to 
accepted wisdom, an industry of three firms can be com-
petitive under the right conditions. The condition for 
competition is created when a portion of compensation 
is redirected from consideration for services rendered to 
pay for performance. A mandatory winner-take-all bonus 
scheme can augment the issuer-pay model. This modest, 
at-the-margin change can create the necessary conditions 
for robust, positive competition.
A compelling rationale supports a mandated, hybrid 
public–private compensation scheme. Credit ratings are 
more than just the opinions of a private actor; they are a 
public good. Rating agencies enjoy a regulatory license 
that necessitates their service and gives them market sta-
tus, and the credit rating system exists in a capital market 
that creates significant network externalities. Rating 
agencies are private firms that report to shareholders, but 
they also serve as public gatekeepers. The main goal of 
regulation should be to change the incentives by altering 
the relationship among rating agencies. By mandating 
a self-funded bonus pool, each firm is forced to post a 
bond on good performance and a winner-take-all tour-
nament is created. At least with respect to the bonus, 
rating agencies will not be oligopolists but instead will 
be competitors. A change in the relationship will change 
behavior.
Unlike other proposed reforms, this proposal does not 
require a fundamental transformation of the industrial 
organization and regulatory framework. It maintains the 
duopoly plus industry organization and the issuer-pay 
model. This contrarian perspective is the proposal’s prin-
cipal benefit. It is fair to say that as much as 95 percent 
of the status quo would be preserved.
The reform is economically feasible and adminis-
trable in a fair, coherent way. As with all reform of Wall 
Street, the greatest barrier to reform is the politics of 
regulation and the alignment of interests. In this regard, 
there would be a sufficient constituency of bond inves-
tors who would be interested in seeing an improve-
ment in the quality of credit ratings as evinced by the 
passages of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 and the provisions relating to rating agencies in the 
Dodd–Frank Act. Although these statutes did not funda-
mentally change the credit rating industry, they laid the 
foundation necessary to implement the reform proposal 
advanced in this article.
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